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TERRORISM FINANCING INDICATORS FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES
Richard Gordon
At least since the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) first
published its Forty Recommendations, financial institutions in FATFcompliant jurisdictions have been required to implement preventive
measures that require FIs to identify customers, establish client profiles,
monitor for unusual transactions, review those transactions to see if there
was suspicion that they involved the proceeds of crime and, if so, report the
transaction to the authorities in the form of a suspicious transaction report
(STR). When these requirements were first established, neither financial
institutions nor their supervisors/regulators had much experience as to
what in a client’s profile and the client’s patterns of transactions might
indicate money laundering. However, based on an expanding knowledge of
how criminals tend to launder their money, over time financial institutions
have developed increasingly effective detection and reporting systems. By
studying known examples of laundering, the FATF, FATF-Style Regional
Bodies, and national competent authorities (especially financial intelligence
units) have identified patterns or indicators of possible money laundering,
and made them available to financial institutions as money laundering
typologies. In addition, there has been some feedback from financial
intelligence units and other competent authorities to financial institutions
with respect to their anti-money laundering programs. Using these sources,
financial institutions have been able to develop systems to help them
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determine which transactions carry a materially greater risk that
laundering is involved.
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the FATF
adopted the VIII Special Recommendations on terrorist financing. Among
these new requirements were that financial institutions also report to
authorities if they suspected that a transaction involved the financing of
terrorism. However, there was little in the way of known patterns of
terrorism financing that financial institutions could use to help identify such
transactions. While since that time a number of limited typology studies
have been made available by the FATF, no comprehensive study of
terrorism financing typologies has yet been published. For this reason, the
Counter-terrorism Implementation Task Force requested a comprehensive
study on past terrorism financing techniques that would add to value to
efforts by both financial institutions and governmental authorities in
identifying terrorism financing transactions or patterns, also known as
typologies.
This preliminary report on prosecutions in the U.S examined 266
instances of prosecutions that involve charges of terrorism, material
support of terrorism, or other terrorism-related matters. Of that number,
thirty were determined to involve financial institutions. Using only publicly
available information, the study found twenty-four where there was
sufficient information on financial transactions to see if there were any
discernible patterns or typologies for terrorism financing. The study
revealed that sixteen of those indicated known typologies of money
laundering, although an additional three appear to involve diversion of
charitable donations. In only one was there a typology that suggested
possible terrorism financing and not laundering. Of the sixteen cases
involving suspicious transactions only three appeared to involve criminal
proceeds. From these cases, it appears that terrorists often use money
laundering techniques to disguise the origins of funds or to prevent
competent authorities from tracing payments from end-users to originators,
even when the origin is not criminal proceeds. However, because it was not
possible to review any STRs (referred to in the U.S. as Suspicious Activity
Reports or SARs) that may have been filed by financial institutions with
respect to these transactions, it was not possible to determine if financial
institutions, in conducting their review of those transactions, had
determined that they were suspicious with respect to money laundering or
terrorism financing. It was also impossible to know if FinCEN had referred
such SARs to law enforcement for further investigation, or if they had added
actionable intelligence to the SARs that would suggest either money
laundering or terrorism financing. Such reviews would be most helpful in
completing the study.
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I. THE GLOBAL STANDARD AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING AND
TERRORISM FINANCING1
A.

Overview

Over the past forty years, anti-money laundering rules have been
expanded and refined.2 The vast majority of the world’s jurisdictions now
1

Some of the introductory material for this Report is adopted from Richard K. Gordon,
Trysts or Terrorists? Financial Institutions and the Search for Bad Guys, 43 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 699 (2008) [hereinafter Gordon, Trysts or Terrorists?] and Richard K. Gordon, Losing the War Against Dirty Money: Rethinking Global Standards on Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 503 (2011).
2
The first anti-money laundering law enacted in the U.S. was The Currency and Foreign
Transactions Reporting Act of 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b, 1951–59 (2000), 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5314(e), 5316–5530, 5332(2)
(2000), and 18 U.S.C. §§1956-1957, 1960 (2009)) [hereinafter Bank Secrecy Act]. Antimoney laundering laws were expanded in 1986, 1988, 1992, 1994, 1998, 2001, and 2004.
History of Anti-Money Laundering Laws, FINCEN, http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/aml_
history.html (last visited May 20, 2012) (FinCEN is the U.S. financial intelligence unit); see
also Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Criminal Law: The Tenuous Relationship Between the
Fight Against Money Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance, 93 J. CRIM. L. &
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endorse the latest version of the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF)
Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering (FATF 40
Recommendations)3 and accompanying Methodology for Assessment.4
CRIMINOLOGY 311, 338–69 (2003) (exploring the federal laws and regulations available to
prosecute money laundering). The EU’s efforts began in 1991 with its first anti-money laundering Directive. Council Directive 91/308/EEC, 1991 O.J. (L 166) 77 (EC). They were
expanded significantly with the second and third anti-money laundering Directives in 2001
and 2004. Council Directive 2001/97/EEC, 2001 O.J. (L 344) 76 (EC); Council Directive
2005/60/EEC, 2005 O.J. (L 309) 15 (EC); see also Alan E. Sorcher, Lost in Implementation:
Financial Institutions Face Challenges Complying with Anti-Money Laundering Laws, 18
TRANSNAT’L L. 395, 408–10, 414 (2005) (discussing the development of anti-money laundering law in the EU). The first multilateral convention including anti-money laundering provisions came into force in 1988. U.N. Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. This was followed by conventions expanding anti-money laundering provisions. See,
e.g., The Council of Europe, Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation
of the Proceeds from Crime, Nov. 8, 1990, E.T.S. No. 141 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1993)
[hereinafter Strasbourg Convention]; U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime, Sept. 29, 2003, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209. The Financial Action Task Force published its
first set of 40 Recommendations on money laundering in 1990. These original Recommendations were revised and expanded in 1996. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE [FATF], FORTY
RECOMMENDATIONS ON MONEY LAUNDERING 2 (June 28, 1996); see also FATF, FORTY
RECOMMENDATIONS (2003) [hereinafter FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS]. Following the attacks
of September 11, 2001, the FATF added 8 Special Recommendations against Terrorism
Finance; a 9th Recommendation was added in 2004. History of the FATF, FATF,
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/historyofthefatf/ (last visited May 21, 2012). Since
the FATF’s first set of 40 Recommendations on Money Laundering, the definition of financial institution has been extended, (and certain requirements have been extended to include
some persons who are not financial institutions). In addition, rules on record-keeping have
been tightened, but the general framework of client identification, recordkeeping, client
monitoring, and reporting of suspicious activities has not changed. Compare FATF 40
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra, at 16 (defining financial institution as any person or entity engaged in specific transactions, such as accepting deposits, lending, transfers, and others),
with id. at 7 (obligating other institutions, such as casinos, real estate agents, dealers in precious metals, lawyers, and trust and company service providers, to adhere to the same standards).
3
FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that 130 countries have endorsed the 40 Recommendations). In 2002, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) endorsed
the FATF 40 Recommendations (and the FATF VIII Special Recommendations on Terrorist
Financing (2001)), which were amended in 2004 to include Special Recommendation IX.
IMF Advances Efforts to Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Finance, IMF (Pub. Info.
Notice No. 02/87, Aug. 8, 2002) [hereinafter IMF Pub. Notice], available at http://www.imf.
org/external/np/sec/pn/2002/pn0287.htm; see also IMF, REPORT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE
FATF PLENARY MEETING AND PROPOSAL FOR THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE METHODOLOGY FOR
ASSESSING COMPLIANCE WITH THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE
FINANCING OF TERRORISM (AML/CFT) STANDARD (2002) [hereinafter FATF PLENARY
MEETING], available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/aml/2002/eng/110 802.pdf (proposing endorsement of the FATF Recommendations to the IMF Executive Board). Because
nearly every country in the world is a member of the IMF, this endorsement has significant
resonance. IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors, IMF,
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Starting in 1990, these global standards have required financial institutions5
to monitor the transactions of their customers, to examine unusual
transactions to determine if they might involve the proceeds of crime6 and
since 2001—the financing of terrorism,7 and to report any suspicious
transactions to special government authorities known as financial
intelligence units (FIUs). The FIUs then analyze the reports (known as
suspicious transaction reports (STRs)), along with other relevant data, and
make recommendations to law enforcement as to which clients or
transactions should be investigated.8
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 resulted in governments
greatly intensifying their anti-money laundering activities and prompted an
intensified global effort against terrorism financing.9 In 2002, the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank adopted the FATF 40
Recommendations and the eight new Special Recommendations on
Terrorism Financing (Special Recommendations) as a world standard.10
They, along with the FATF and various regional anti-money laundering
groups known as FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs), also began a joint
global compliance program by assessing the extent to which individual

http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm (last visited May 21, 2012). More
importantly, each member of the FATF and each of the eight FATF associate members and
FATF-style regional bodies has endorsed the FATF 40 Recommendations and Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing the as the global standard for anti- money laundering
and combating the financing of terrorism. See Financial Action Task Force, Members and
Observers, IMF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/membersandobservers/ (last visited
May 21, 2012) (listing all members of FATF); see also PAUL ALLAN SCHOTT, REFERENCE
GUIDE TO ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM, at III7–III-13 (2d ed. 2006), available at http://zunia.org/uploads/media/knowledge/Reference
_Guide_AMLCFT_2ndSupplement1.pdf (summarizing FATF’s mission and FATF member
obligations).
4
See FATF, METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING COMPLIANCE WITH THE FATF 40
RECOMMENDATIONS AND FATF 9 SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS 73 (2009) [hereinafter
METHODOLOGY] (listing the endorsing bodies, including the IMF, World Bank, and a number
of regional financial interest groups).
5
See generally FATF PLENARY MEETING, supra note 3 (detailing the development of the
standards over time).
6
See FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 7–8 (Recommendations 11–15 directing financial institutions to be aware of certain types of suspicious transactions).
7
See generally FATF, SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON TERRORIST FINANCING (2001)
[hereinafter SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS] (proposing recommendations focused on terrorism
for addition to the original recommendations).
8
SCHOTT, supra note 3, at VII-3–5.
9
Richard K. Gordon, On the Use and Abuse of Standards for Law: Global Governance
and Offshore Centers, 88 N.C.L. REV. 501, 564 (2010).
10
IMF Pub. Notice, supra note 3.
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countries were implementing those standards.11 Failure to implement the
standards adequately can result in a broad application of sanctions or
countermeasures, including bans on doing business with financial
institutions located within the borders of non-complying jurisdictions.12 As
a result, millions of STRs have been forwarded to FIUs by financial
institutions throughout the world, although how many have resulted in
further investigation, prosecution, and conviction is not publically
available.13
The FATF’s 40 Recommendations and the Special
Recommendations are designed to “provide an enhanced, comprehensive
and consistent framework of measures for combating money laundering and
terrorist financing.”14 Together they cover, among other things, the
criminalization of money laundering and terrorism financing, the freezing
and seizing of criminal proceeds and terrorism funds, key preventive
measures against laundering and terrorism financing for financial
institutions and other institutions subject to preventive measures, FIUs, and

11
METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 2–3 (stating that a uniform system of assessment, including a single assessment methodology, was agreed to by the IMF, the World Bank and the
FATF in 2002). IMF assessment reports can be found at Detailed Assessment Reports, IMF,
http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=175 (last updated May 24, 2012). World Bank
assessments can be found at Financial Market Integrity – Assessments, WORLD BANK,
http://go.worldbank.org/Y902MD2ZL0 (last visited May 24, 2012). These bodies and each
of the eight FATF associate members and FATF-style regional bodies (many of which are
undertaken with the participation of the IMF and World Bank) use the uniform assessment
system. FATF assessments can be found at Mutual Evaluations, FATF, http://www.fatfgafi.org/topics/mutualevaluations/ (last visited May 24, 2012) and those of regional bodies
can be found at Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT)
– Assessments, IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/amlcft/eng/aml2.htm#reports (last
visited May 24, 2012).
12
See FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 9 (in particular, Recommendation 21
stating: “[f]inancial institutions should give special attention to business relationships and
transactions with persons, including companies and financial institutions, from countries
which do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendation . . . Where such a country
continues not to apply or insufficiently applies the FATF Recommendations, countries
should be able to apply appropriate countermeasures.”). For example, under Title III, Sec.
311(a) of the USA Patriot Act, if a financial institution is operating with a jurisdiction outside of the U.S. and there is concern about that jurisdiction’s money laundering efforts, the
Secretary of the Treasury “may prohibit, or impose conditions upon, the opening or maintaining in the U.S. of a correspondent account or payable- through account by any domestic
financial institution or domestic financial agency for or on behalf of a foreign banking institution.” USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 301 (codified as amended at 31
U.S.C. § 5318A(b)(5) (2004)).
13
E-mail from Boudewijn Verhelst, President, Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence
Units, to author (Feb. 27, 2010) (on file with author) [hereinafter Verhelst e-mail].
14
FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2 at 2.
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international cooperation.15 The 40 Recommendations have included similar
preventive measure requirements since the original 1990 draft.16 In effect,
these Recommendations divide the responsibility for preventing and
uncovering money laundering between the private and public sector.

15

The FATF 40 Recommendations are broken down into 4 groups. First is Group A, titled
“Legal Systems,” which includes the “scope of the criminal offence of money laundering”
and “provisional measures and confiscation.” Id. at 3–4. Second is Group B, titled “Measures
to be Taken by Financial Institutions and [certain] Non-Financial Businesses and Professions
to Prevent Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing,” which includes prohibition on shell
banks, customer due diligence and record-keeping (including client identification and transaction monitoring), reporting of suspicious transactions and compliance (including internal
training and audit programs), other measures to deter money laundering and terrorist financing (including sanctions for failure to comply with the Recommendations), measures to be
taken with respect to countries that do not or insufficiently comply with the FATF Recommendations, and regulation and supervision. Id. at 4–10. Third is Group C, titled “Institutional and Other Measures Necessary in Systems for Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing,” which includes competent authorities and their powers and resources (including the establishment of a financial intelligence unit) and transparency of legal persons
and arrangements. Id. at 10–12. Fourth is Group D, titled “International Co-operation,”
which includes international commitment to implement various treaties, mutual legal assistance and extradition, and other forms of co-operation. Id. at 12–14. The IX Special Recommendations include: (1) ratification and implementation of UN instruments; (2) criminalizing
the financing of terrorism and associated money laundering; (3) freezing and confiscating
terrorist assets; (4) reporting suspicious transactions related to terrorism (also required in
Recommendation 13); (5) international co-operation, (6) alternative remittance systems; (7)
wire transfers; (8) non-profit organizations; and (9) cash couriers. See generally FATF, IX
SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS (2010) [hereinafter IX SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS].
16
Since 1990, there has been a progressive expansion of those persons who must follow
the “preventive measures” provisions in the FATF 40 Recommendations. See FATF, FORTY
RECOMMENDATIONS (1990), available at http://www.accessbankplc.com/Library/Documents/
Download%20Centre/FATF.pdf; see also FATF, 40 RECOMMENDATIONS 1295 (1996), available at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/fatf_40_recommendations.pdf. The current definition of financial institutions includes any person who engages in acceptance of
deposits and other repayable funds from the public; lending; financial leasing; the transfer of
money or value; issuing and managing means of payment (e.g. credit and debit cards, checks,
traveler’s checks, money orders and bankers’ drafts, electronic money); financial guarantees
and commitments; trading in: money market instruments (checks, bills, CDs, derivatives
etc.), foreign exchange, exchange, interest rate and index instruments, transferable securities,
commodity futures trading; participation in securities issues and the provision of financial
services related to such issues; individual and collective portfolio management; safekeeping
and administration of cash or liquid securities on behalf of other persons; otherwise investing, administering or managing funds or money on behalf of other persons; underwriting and
placement of life insurance and other investment related insurance; and money and currency
changing. METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 65–66. Since 2003, most of the preventive
measures prescribed for financial institutions have been extended to certain designated nonfinancial businesses and persons including: casinos (which also includes internet casinos);
real estate agents; dealers in precious metals; dealers in precious stones; lawyers; notaries;
other independent legal professionals and accountants; and trust and company service providers. Id. at 64.
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FATF Recommendations 5 through 13, plus 21 and 22 (and the
relevant materials in the accompanying Methodology for assessment of
compliance) set out the part of the preventive measures system that applies
financial institutions. Unfortunately these Recommendations are not a
model of clarity and are not easy for non-experts to comprehend.17
However, they are designed to create a five-part requirement:18 financial
institutions must (1) establish and maintain customer identity (including
beneficial owner and controller of the legal title holder of the account); (2)
create and maintain an up-to-date customer profile;19 (3) monitor
transactions to see if they fit with the customer profile of transactions that
are legitimate; (4) if not, examine further any such transaction to see if it
might represent the proceeds of crime or financing of terrorism, including
by examining the source of funds; and (5) if so, report the transaction to the
FIU, along with a description of why the financial institution believes that
the transaction is suspicious. Recommendations 18, 19, and 26 through 34
(and the relevant materials in the accompanying Methodology for
assessment of compliance) address both the supervisory system to ensure
that the financial institution comply with their preventive measures
requirements and the criminal investigation and prosecution system.

17

See Navin Beekarry, The International Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of the
Financing of Terrorism Regulatory Strategy: A Critical Analysis of Compliance Determinants in International Law, 31 NW. J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 137, 159–60 (2011) (describing the
sometimes contradictory and confusing language in the Recommendations). In 2002 an attempt was made by the IMF to reorganize the preventive measures Recommendations into a
more accessible, coherent whole. However, in a series of meetings in 2002 delegations to the
FATF rejected the effort.
18
A working group consisting of the Commonwealth Secretariat, the U.N. Office on
Drugs ands Crime, the World Bank, and the IMF has drafted a model regulation for the prevention of money laundering and the financing of terrorism as part of a model law on antimoney laundering and terrorism financing. The Model Regulation implements these FATF
Recommendations based on the regulatory frameworks in the U.K., Canada, Australia, and
Hong Kong. Article 5.1(a)–(e) of the Model Regulation outlines CDD as the “(a) identification of customers, including beneficial owners; (b) gathering of information on customers to
create a customer profile; (c) application of acceptance policies to new customers; (d)
maintenance of customer information on an ongoing basis; [and the] (e) monitoring of customer transactions.” Model Regulation (2006) (on file with the U.N. Office on Drugs and
Crime). Article 10 describes a customer profile as being “of sufficient nature and detail . . . to
monitor the customer’s transactions, apply enhanced customer due diligence where necessary, and detect suspicious transactions.” Id.
19
If a new customer profile suggests that the customer is opening an account with proceeds of crime, the financial institution should go directly to Step 4. Id.
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The financial institution’s role focuses on three basic objectives.
The first is to help exclude from the financial system possible criminal and
terrorist elements. The FATF 40 and Special IX do this by making financial
institutions identify and profile potential—and, periodically, existing—
customers to screen out possible criminals and terrorists.20 The second is to
make available to law enforcement financial information that can be used in
criminal investigations or as evidence in a prosecution. The FATF 40 +
Special IX do this by requiring the private sector to maintain records of the
identity of all clients and their transactions.21 The third is to identify
customers who might be criminals or terrorists so that law enforcement can
decide whether to investigate and prosecute such persons. The FATF 40 +
Special IX do this by requiring the private sector to monitor customer
transactions based on their profiles and report to law enforcement those that
raise suspicion that criminal proceeds or terrorism financing are involved.
The U.S. largely complies with these requirements through
statutory and regulatory measures (although the US does not extend these
requirements to all those designated non-financial businesses and persons as
defined in the Methodology), as well as through guidance issued to financial
institutions.22 The E.U. also largely complies through both Directives
20

See infra Part I.B.2, notes 38–48, and accompanying text.
See infra Part I.B.2, notes 49–51, and accompanying text.
22
See generally Bank Secrecy Act, supra note 2 (requiring U.S. institutions to assist U.S.
government agencies in the detection and preventions of money laundering). See M.
MAUREEN MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31208, INTERNATIONAL MONEY
LAUNDERING ABATEMENT AND ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING ACT OF 2001,TITLE III OF P.L.
107–56 (2001) (providing an overview of the Patriot Act’s role in counterterrorism via antimoney laundering efforts); FATF, THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT ON ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
83–226 (2006) (describing the laws and regulations in the U.S. pertaining to money laundering and evaluating the quality of these standards) [hereinafter U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION
REPORT]; Megan Roberts, Big Brother Isn't Just Watching You, He's Also Wasting Your Tax
Payer Dollars: An Analysis of the Anti-Money Laundering Provisions of the USA Patriot Act,
56 RUTGERS L. REV. 573, 586–7 (2004) (describing the relevant sections of the Patriot Act
and their impact on financial institutions). Regulations on customer identification are found
in 31 C.F.R. § 103.121 (2006). 31 U.S.C. § 5314(b) authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury
to require financial institutions to report suspicious transactions. It is implemented at 21
C.F.R. § 21.110 (2006). There are similar customer identification rules for securities brokerdealers, mutual funds, and futures commission merchants and introducing brokers in commodities. 31 C.F.R. § 103.121 (2006); 31 C.F.R. § 103.122 (2006); see also Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Anti-Money Laundering, NOTICE TO MEMBERS NO. 02–21, at 5–7
(2002) (providing guidance to financial institutions in the implementation of anti-money
laundering protocol); Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Anti-Money Laundering
Customer Identification Programs for Brokers/Dealers, NOTICE TO MEMBERS NO. 03-34, at
347 (2003) (notifying members of the implementation of the Patriot Act as pertains to financial institutions). Under 31 C.F.R. § 103.137(c) (2006), a life insurer is required to have
policies and procedures for obtaining “all relevant customer-related information necessary
for an effective anti-money laundering program.”
21
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(essentially instructions to members of the Union) and implementing
legislation at the member state level.23 The language used to implement the
Recommendations is often similar to that found in the Recommendations.24
2.

Details

FATF Recommendation 5 requires that financial institutions
identify their customers, including the beneficial owner of a customer
account, which, in the case of legal persons and other legal arrangements
such as trusts, includes taking “reasonable measures” to identify the
physical persons who own or control the legal person.25 Recommendation
12 extends these requirements to certain designated non-financial
businesses and persons (known as DNFBPs; for purposes of this Report the
term “financial institution” should be read to include DNFBPs), which
include casinos (which often deal with cash that can be exchanged for chips
and vice versa, providing laundering opportunities), real estate agents (in
part because real estate is often of high value, it is often used as an
investment vehicle by launderers), dealers in precious metals (included for
similar reasons, plus the fact that the ownership of precious metals can be
easily transferred), lawyers, notaries, and persons who assist in the setting
up of trusts and companies (these are often professionals who assist
launderers in hiding assets).26 Although neither the Recommendation itself
nor the Methodology uses the term “client profile,” Recommendation 5
requires that the financial institutions determine the purpose and intended
nature of the business relationship of a potential—and periodically, of a

23
Sorcher, supra note 2 at 408–10 (discussing the various Directives already applied and
the structure of the proposed “Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive”).
24
Compare FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 5 (Recommendation 5 describing the measures to be taken in performing customer due diligence), with Money Laundering
Regulations, 2007, S.I. 2007/2157, art. 5 (U.K.) (adopting language almost identical to FATF
Recommendation 5 in describing the measures to be taken for customer due diligence). Furthermore, in the course of their assessment work for the IMF and the World Bank, researchers have reviewed implementing statutory and regulatory language in The British Virgin
Islands, Hong Kong, Niger, the Philippines, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and the U.K. and often
found language nearly identical to that used in the Recommendations and Methodology. This
may be due to decisions to enact the two verbatim so as to ensure that legislation complies
with the standard.
25
FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 5–6 (Recommendation 5 requiring customer due-diligence and record-keeping). The Methodology allows an exception from this
latter requirement in the event the legal person is a public company. METHODOLOGY, supra
note 4, at 17–18.
26
FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 7. Recommendation 22 requires that the
principles applicable to financial institutions also be applied to branches and majority owned
subsidiaries located abroad. Id. at 9.
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current—client and a “knowledge of the customer, their business and risk
profile, including, where necessary, the source of funds.”27
This serves two purposes. If a financial institution cannot establish a
potential client’s identity and profile, it must terminate the business
relationship.28 Second, the financial institution can measure future
transactions of accepted clients against this baseline of normal or typical
transactions. Specifically, financial institutions must “obtain information on
the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship . . . [and]
conduct ongoing customer due diligence on the business relationship,” and
undertake a “scrutiny of transactions under taken throughout the course of
th[e] relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted are
consistent with the institution’s knowledge of the customer, its business and
risk profile, including, where necessary, the source of funds.”29 If the
financial institution cannot comply, the financial institution should
terminate business relations or not undertake a transaction.30 Second, the
client profile allows the financial institutions to monitor client transactions
to see if they are unusual compared with the profile.
A key development in the 2003 Recommendations was the adoption
of an optional risk-based approach for certain preventive measures.
According to the Financial Action Task Force, the adoption of risk
sensitivity “involve[s] identifying and categorizing money laundering risks
and establishing reasonable controls based on risks identified . . . .”31 This
risk-based program, which apparently does not apply to terrorism financing,
contrasts with the previous program, in which each of the FATF
Recommendations was to be implemented objectively regardless of relative
risk levels.32 FATF Recommendation 5 now allows financial institutions to
27

Id. at 5.
Id. at 9. Recommendation 18 also forbids financial institutions to transact business with
shell banks and “guard against” establishing relations with those that do. Id.
29
METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 17.
30
Id. at 19. It should also consider filing a suspicious transaction report to the Financial
Intelligence Unit, but is not required to do so. FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at
8.
31
FATF, GUIDANCE ON THE RISK-BASED APPROACH TO COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING
AND TERRORIST FINANCING: HIGH LEVEL PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES 2 (2007) [hereinafter
GUIDANCE ON RBA]. The U.S. has adopted a risk-based system. See FED. FIN. INST.
EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANK SECRECY ACT/ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING EXAMINATION
MANUAL 11–27, I-1, K-1, M-1, M-1–2 (2006) [hereinafter FFIEC MANUAL] (describing
implementation of the Bank Secrecy Act with a risk-based approach).
32
GUIDANCE ON RBA, supra note 31, at 2. According to the FATF, the new focus on risk
allows financial institutions and supervisory authorities to be more efficient and effective in
their use of resources and minimize burdens on customers, although it does not say exactly
how. Id. During the years when the FATF was considering the adoption of a risk basedapproach disagreement tended to arise at between those FATF delegates from a law enforcement background and those from a regulatory, particularly bank regulatory background,
28
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determine the extent of such measures on a risk-sensitive basis, depending
on the type of customer, business relationship, or transaction.33 Other
Recommendations address new technologies and reliance on third parties
for due diligence.34
Recommendation 10 requires that financial institutions maintain
customer records, including identification and transaction records sufficient
to permit reconstruction of individual transactions for evidence in a
prosecution, and that these records be maintained for at least five years and
be available for inspection by competent authorities.35 Special
Recommendation VII provides more detail with respect to wire transfers.36

with the latter arguing in favor of a risk-based approach. In general, the banking regulators
were used to dealing with concepts of risk while law enforcement was not. “Supervisors
must be satisfied that banks and banking groups have in place a comprehensive risk management process (including Board and senior management oversight) to identify, evaluate,
monitor and control or mitigate all material risks.” BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION 3 (2006), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs129.pdf.
33
FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 19. The Methodology goes on to provide
certain examples of higher risk categories. METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 17. Recommendation 6 singles out a particular category of customers, those individuals who are or have
been entrusted with prominent public functions in a foreign country, as well as family members or close associates, which are termed politically-exposed persons. FATF 40
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 22. It requires financial institutions and DNFBP to have
risk management systems to determine if customers are politically-exposed persons and to
take reasonable measures to establish the “source of wealth and source of funds” and to
“conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship.” In other words, if a
customer is a politically exposed person the financial institution and certain others must
always take measures to establish the source of funds. Recommendation 6 was added in 2003
to address a perceived public backlash against developed country banks that had laundered
the proceeds of developed country dictators. Id. at 5–6.
34
Under FATF Recommendation 8, “[f]inancial institutions should pay special attention
to any money laundering threats that may arise from new or developing technologies,” and
recommends that they have “policies and procedures in place to address any specific risks
associated with non-face to face business relationships or transactions.” Id. at 6. FATF Recommendation 9 permits financial institutions to rely on third parties to undertake some due
diligence measures in certain cases. Id.
35
Id. at 7. FATF Recommendation 10 also suggests that financial institutions keep and
maintain client account records, and that they “must be sufficient to permit reconstruction of
individual transactions (including the amounts and types of currency involved if any) so as to
provide, if necessary, evidence for prosecution of criminal activity.” Id. Competent authorities are defined as “all administrative and law enforcement authorities concerned with combating money laundering and terrorist financing, including the FIU and supervisors.”
METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 62. An FIU is a financial intelligence unit. Id. at 66.
36
See IX SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 15, at 3 (recommending that countries
take actions to enhance their security and gain meaningful originator information for wire
transfers).
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This, along with Recommendation 5, allows investigative and prosecutorial
authorities to “follow the money” of criminal suspects.37
Recommendation 11 requires that “[f]inancial institutions pay
special attention to complex, unusual large and all unusual patterns of
transactions, which have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose.”38
Financial institutions must examine, “as far as possible,” the background
and purpose of such transactions, and establish their findings in writing.39
This requirement is separate from Recommendation 5’s requirement for
ongoing customer due diligence with respect to “scrutiny of transactions.”40
Recommendation 13 requires that a financial institution report promptly to
the governmental FIU if it “suspects” or has “reasonable grounds” to
suspect that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity.41 The
Methodology describes this as filing an STR.42 Key to the subject of this
Report, Special Recommendation IV further requires financial institutions
to file reports if they suspect terrorism financing.43
Most jurisdictions provide a template or form for filing STRs (or, in
the U.S., Suspicious Activity Reports: SARs). The U.S. form requires, in
addition to financial institutions, client, and transaction identification
information that a box be checked to characterize the suspicious activity.
Options include “structuring/money laundering” and “terrorism financing,”
as well as various boxes relating to fraud, embezzlement, and identity

37

FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 4–5 (proposing identification requirements that will allow institutions and governments to more easily trace accounts). The U.S.
has put in place similar rules. FFIEC MANUAL, supra note 45, at 31, 118–22, 261–64 (detailing identification procedures for different types of customers in order to ensure accounts and
transactions are traceable).
38
FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 7.
39
Id. at 5, 7 (Recommendations 5 and 10 listing necessary information to be kept on file
and how files should be managed).
40
Id. at 5; see also METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 25 (“A financial institution should be
required by law or regulation to report to the FIU (a suspicious transaction report–STR)
when it suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity.”).
41
METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 25.
42
Id.
43
SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 7, at 2. Recommendation 21 requires that
financial institutions and DNFBP pay “special attention” to business relationships and transactions with persons from countries that do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations (although it does not say how this is to differ from non-special (or average) attention). FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 9. This Recommendation raises the
costs of doing business with persons from countries that do not sufficiently apply the Recommendations as a whole. This creates a financial incentive for countries to implement the
Recommendations, especially as determined by assessment reports. Id.
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theft.44 Also required is a narrative description of the suspected violation,
including what is unusual, irregular, and suspicious about the reported
transaction.45
It is these Recommendations, along with Recommendation 5, that
create the system requiring financial institutions to monitor customer
transactions based on their profiles and to report to law enforcement those
that raise suspicion that criminal proceeds or terrorism financing might be
involved. Recommendation 15 requires financial institutions to develop
internal policies, procedures, and controls for anti-money laundering
programs, including compliance management arrangements, internal training, and audit capacities.46 Recommendation 16 extends most of these
requirements to the same designated non-financial businesses and persons
as found in Recommendation 12, although not all.47
An essential aspect of this part of the preventive measures system
should be emphasized. Financial institutions must design and implement
their own systems.48 While the five-part requirement describes what these
44
FinCEN, Suspicious Activity Report, Part III (Mar. 2011), available at http://www.fin
cen.gov/forms/files/f9022-47_sar-di.pdf.
45
Id. Part V.
46
FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 8.
47
Id. at 8. Recommendation 14 protects financial institutions from any liability for filing
suspicious activities reports and prohibits the reporting person from revealing that such reports are being made (known as the prohibition against tipping off). U.S. rules comply with
these requirements, except that DNFBP include casinos only. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.18–19
(2006) (describing the types of transactions that require reporting, including funds derived
from illegal activity or transactions that have no business or apparent lawful purpose).
48
See, e.g., FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 4 (Recommendation 5 stating:
“[f]inancial institutions should undertake customer due diligence measures . . . but may determine the extent of such measures on a risk sensitive basis. . . .”) (emphasis added); id. at 5
(Recommendation 6 stating that financial systems should “[h]ave appropriate risk management systems. . . .”) (emphasis added); id. at 6 (Recommendation 8 stating: “financial institutions should have policies and procedures in place to address any specific risks associated
with non-face to face business relationships or transactions”) (emphasis added); id. at 6
(Recommendation 9 stating: “[a] financial institution should satisfy itself that the third party
is regulated and supervised for, and has measures in place to comply with [customer due
diligence requirements] in line with Recommendations 5 and 10.”) (emphasis added); id. at 7
(Recommendation 10 stating: “records must be sufficient to permit reconstruction of individual transactions (including the amounts and types of currency involved if any) so as to provide, if necessary, evidence for prosecution of criminal activity.”) (emphasis added); id.
(“Financial institutions should pay special attention to all complex, unusual large transactions . . . . The background and purpose of such transactions should, as far as possible, be
examined, the findings established in writing, and be available to help competent authorities
and auditors.”) (emphasis added); id. at 8 (Recommendation 13 stating: “[i]f a financial
institution suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a
criminal activity, or are related to terrorist financing it should be required to report promptly
its suspicions. . . .”) (emphasis added); id. (“[f]inancial institutions should develop program[]s against money laundering and terrorist financing . . . [including] [t]he development
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systems are supposed to accomplish, it does not provide any detail as to
how they are supposed to do it. Financial institutions are not told how to
implement those requirements. An exception to this is Recommendation 25,
which requires that government authorities establish guidelines and provide
feedback to assist financial institutions and others subject to preventive
measures, “in particular in detecting and reporting suspicious
transactions.”49
Neither compliance reports nor sanctions reported by supervisory
authorities discuss in any detail the design of compliance systems. 50
Financial institutions also do not publicize exactly how they implement
these requirements.51 Clearly, monitoring of transactions to determine if
they vary from the expected client profile is the first key. Such monitoring
appears to be based first, as required by Recommendation 11, on whether a
transaction (or series of transactions) differs in magnitude from that
normally expected of the client, based on the client’s profile. Further
scrutiny of the transaction can determine if something else appears unusual,
such as an unusual transferor or transferee.
One aspect of successful transaction analysis is link analysis, a
technique used to find associations within data that might have relevance to
the particular research question.52 Link analysis explores associations within
collections of data.53 Increasing the number of data sets available increases
the number and types of links that can be identified. There are a number of
different types of data sets that could be helpful in money laundering or
terrorism financing link analysis. First, personal and financial data
(including personal and businesses names, addresses, phone numbers,
of internal policies, procedures and controls, including appropriate compliance management
arrangements. . . .”) (emphasis added).
49
Id. at 10.
50
See id. (Recommendation 25 stating only that guidelines should be established, not what
those guidelines should be).
51
An important barrier to learning more about how firms actually implement their preventive measures is a desire for protecting proprietary information in the context of competitive
concerns, something researchers have learned from numerous interviews conducted with
compliance officers at financial institutions in the U.S., Hong Kong, The British Virgin Islands, and the Philippines over the past five years. See Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and
Anti-Terrorist Financing (ATF): Case Study, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, http://www.pwc.
com/lu/en/anti-money-laundering/case.jhtml (last visited May 22, 2012) (providing almost
no detail on a preventive measures system recommended by an outside consultant).
52
Cuéllar, supra note 2, at 368–69.
53
FINCEN, FEASIBILITY OF A CROSS-BORDER ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER REPORTING
SYSTEM UNDER THE BANK SECRECY ACT 10 (2006), available at http://www.fincen.gov/news
_room/rp/files/CBFTFS_Complete.pdf [hereinafter FINCEN, CROSS-BORDER ELECTRONIC
FUNDS]; see also Cuéllar, supra note 2, at 368–69. Much of the information in the following
two paragraphs of text has been provided by Boudewijn Verhelst. Verhelst e-mail, supra
note 13.
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names of beneficial owners and controllers, bank accounts, deposits, funds
transfers) would link people and businesses through their financial
transactions. For example, this can establish that person A has a relationship
with company B and person C.
Next, descriptive links can be established with databases that
describe the type of business activities normally conducted by the persons
within the link. Such data includes customer identification/profiles and
other information such as that which is found in business directories like
Dunn and Bradstreet. Links can also be made to data that include money
laundering or terrorism financing indicators, such as law enforcement data,
case files, or STRs, can also be made.
Once such descriptive links are established, further analysis can
help determine if a transaction between identified persons looks unusual or
suspicious. For example, if person A has a terrorism-related record or has
made past suspicious transactions, payments to company B or C could raise
suspicion that payments might be related to terrorism financing. This
suspicion could be raised further if person A owns or controls company B
and company B itself has no known business, and if B itself is located in a
jurisdiction where terrorism is known to be active. If C has a record as a
terrorist or terrorist organization, a stronger suspicion might be raised that
the payments were made to finance terrorism. Obviously, the greater the
amount of relevant data and data types, the more extensive will be the link
analysis. However, financial institutions and DNFBPs are restricted in their
access to some useful data sets.
Such use of descriptive links and analysis is also described as data
mining and the use of red flags.54 Such “red flags” or “indicators” are based
on laundering or terrorism financing typologies. Such typologies are those
typically provided by the FATF or local competent authorities (sometimes,
they result from international financial institutions’ own FIU efforts).
Without such typologies it is difficult for financial institutions to know if a
transaction or series of transaction is, in fact, an indicator of laundering or
terrorism financing.
Some financial institutions contract out some of their customer
identification and client monitoring programs to third-party service
providers. A review of some of their programs provides some insight into
services offered. For example, some firms assist in customer identification
and profiling by providing a risk-screening service to check individual or
entity names against a comprehensive data set.55 Firms can also supply
54

G. S. Vidyashankar, Rajesh Natarajan & Subhrangshu Sanyal, Mine Your Way to Combat Money Laundering, Part 2, INFO. MGMT. (Oct. 1, 2007, 1:00 AM), http://www.infor
mation-management.com/specialreports/20071009/1093416-1.html?zkPrintable=true.
55
E.g., WORLD-CHECK ONLINE, http://www.world-check.com/ (last visited May 22, 2012).
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transaction monitoring services. One firm “monitors and detects” suspicious
transactions “across all business lines” using “a fully integrated dynamic
and adaptive multidimensional intelligent engine [which] detects suspicious
activities.”56 This is accomplished using “risk modeling” and “risk-based
algorithms” to “analyze and investigate suspicious activities effectively and
efficiently.”57 Presumably, they use link analysis combined with red-flag
analysis to help determine which transactions warrant the filing of a report.
C.

Public Sector Role

Recommendations 18, 19, and 26 through 32 (and the relevant
materials in the accompanying Methodology for assessment of compliance)
address both the supervisory system—to ensure private sector compliance
with its preventive measures requirements—and the criminal investigation
and prosecution system for state law enforcement authorities.58 The public
sector’s role focuses on three basic objectives. The first objective is to
ensure the private sector’s compliance with their preventive measure
responsibilities. Essentially, governmental authorities must supervise and
regulate financial institutions to ensure compliance. This must include both
guidance and examination functions, including the potential application of
sanctions. The second objective is to ensure that STRs lead to the
investigation of appropriate cases of suspected crime and terrorism.
Essentially, a FIU receives and analyzes these reports along with other key
information. It then decides which should be further investigated, and it
forwards them to the appropriate government agency (typically the police).
The FIU then decides, sometimes in consultation with state prosecutors,
whether and how to go forward.
Recommendation 25 requires that government authorities establish
guidelines and provide feedback to assist financial institutions “in detecting
and reporting suspicious transactions.”59 The Methodology goes further by
56

Press Release, GlobalVision Systems, Inc., American Bankers Association Endorses
PATRIOT OFFICER® as #1 AML/BSA Solution (Dec. 19, 2005), http://www.gv-systems.
com/2010/06/08/american-bankers-association-endorses-patriot-officer%C2%AE-as-1-amlbs
a-solution/ [hereinafter ABA Endorses PATRIOT OFFICER®]. See generally PATRIOT
OFFICER® for Banks, GLOBALVISION SYSTEMS, INC., http://www.gv-systems.com/productssolutions/patriot-officer-for-banks/ (last visited June 11, 2012) (providing anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing monitoring software designed to comply with the USA
Patriot Act and other anti-laundering regulations).
57
ABA Endorses PATRIOT OFFICER®, supra note 56.
58
Recommendations 18 and 19 are listed under the preventive measures section of the
FATF Recommendations; 26 through 32 are under “C. Institutional and Other Measures
Necessary in Systems for Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: Competent
authorities, Their Powers and Resources.” FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 9–
11.
59
Id. at 10.
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stating that authorities should provide a description of money-laundering
and terrorism-financing techniques and methods and any additional
measures to ensure that the systems are implemented by financial
institutions.60 This includes information on current techniques, methods and
trends (typologies);61 examples of actual money laundering cases; and caseby-case feedback, including if an STR was found to relate to a legitimate
transaction.
In order to ensure compliance with the preventive measures,
Recommendation 23 requires that financial institutions be subject to
adequate regulation and supervision to ensure implementation of the
preventive measures,62 while Recommendations 29 and 17 require that
supervisors have adequate powers to ensure compliance including the
imposition of sanctions.63 Recommendation 26 requires that countries
establish an FIU64 to serve as a national center for the receipt, analysis, and
60

METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 33.
See Methods and Trends, FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/methodsandtrends/ (last
visited May 22, 2012).
The methods used for laundering money and the financing of terrorism are in constant evolution. As the international financial sector implements the FATF standards, criminals must find alternative channels to launder proceeds of criminal activities and finance illicit activities. The FATF identifies new threats and researches
money laundering and terrorist financing methods. FATF Typologies reports describe and explain their nature, thus increasing global awareness and allowing for
earlier detection.
Id.
62
FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 9–10. Recommendation 24 extends this
requirement to designated non-financial businesses and persons. Id. at 10.
63
Id. at 9, 11. U.S. laws also comply with these requirements. See 31 C.F.R. § 103 (2004)
(addressing “financial recordkeeping and reporting of currency and foreign transactions”);
see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-1 (1980) (requiring recordkeeping of financial transactions).
The U.S. has levied significant fines, as well as other supervisory and regulatory orders,
against financial institutions and casinos. See David Zaring & Elena Baylis, Sending the
Bureaucracy to War, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1361, 1414–15 (2007).
Since September 11, FinCEN has imposed a staggering number of fines on banks
for failing to meet its reporting requirements. Moreover, those fines have been extraordinarily large. ABN AMRO, a large European bank, has been hit with a $30
million fine (and more from state regulators). Western Union has also been hit with
a $30 million fine for its record-keeping failures. And the Department of Justice
has brought criminal prosecutions for anti-money-laundering violations, which resulted in a $50 million civil monetary penalty against AmSouth and $43 million in
combined criminal and civil fines against Riggs Bank, which put the bank out of
business.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
64
FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 10–11. The line between what some
countries formally refer to as their financial intelligence unit and other law enforcement
agencies is often blurry. This Report refers to the financial intelligence unit using a function61
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dissemination of STRs and other information regarding potential money
laundering or terrorist financing. It further states that the FIU should have
timely access, directly or indirectly, to the financial, administrative, and
law-enforcement information that it requires to properly undertake its
functions, including the analysis of STRs.65 Recommendation 10 states that
competent authorities (including FIUs) should have access to records kept
by financial institutions and DNFBPs.66 Finally, Recommendation 40 states
that countries should ensure that their competent authorities provide the
widest possible range of international cooperation to their foreign
counterparts, including information relating to money laundering, provided
that controls and safeguards are in place to ensure that information
exchanged is used only in a manner consistent with obligations concerning
privacy and data protection.67 The Methodology further states that FIUs
should be authorized to allow foreign intelligence units to search their own
databases, including law enforcement databases, subject to confidentiality
safeguards limiting the use of the data.68 This is the only substantive
Recommendation relating to FIUs.69
al definition. See What is an FIU?, THE EGMONT GROUP FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS,
http://www.egmontgroup.org/about/what-is-an-fiu (last visited May 22, 2012) (describing the
different types of FIUs); The Egmont Group, The Egmont Definition of a Financial Intelligence Unit 1–2 (interpretive note, last visited May 22, 2012), available at http://www.eg
montgroup.org/library/download/8 (providing a functional definition of FIU not cabined to
any particular sort of law enforcement).
65
FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 10–11. For example, FinCEN has access
to numerous databases. These include several databases of criminal reports sourced from the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s TECS II system, the FBI’s National Criminal
Information Center, the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
Information and NDIC Systems, the U.S. Secret Service database, and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service. It also has access to the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s list of Specially
Designated Nationals, the Social Security Administration’s Death Master File, and the State
Department’s list of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. It also has access to commercial database services from organizations such as Dun & Bradstreet, LEXIS/NEXIS, and
credit bureaus as well as commercially available lists of “Politically Exposed Persons.” FinCEN also maintains its own database of investigations and queries conducted through FinCEN’s systems. FINCEN, CROSS-BORDER ELECTRONIC FUNDS, supra note 53, at 9–10.
66
FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 7.
67
Id. at 13–14.
68
METHODOLOGY, supra note 4, at 46.
69
See generally FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, at 13. The draft methodology
included a significant number of criteria spelling out in detail the duties of financial intelligence units, including most of those described in infra notes and accompanying text. However, during a meeting in Basel in February, 2002 representatives of the Egmont Group, an
informal association of financial intelligence units, objected to the spelling out in such detail
of the purposes and activities of FIUs because of the difficulty of finding consensus on such
a large amount of detail from such a large group. Nevertheless, the representatives largely
concurred that the criteria in the methodology described an effective financial intelligence
unit. IMF, ANNUAL REPORT 2002, at 38 (2002). The U.S. largely complies with these re-
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Dividing the task of determining suspicious and really suspicious
transactions between the private sector and public FIUs usually begins with
the receipt of an STR, after which the FIU engages in a two-part analysis. In
the first part, known as “tactical analysis,” the FIU looks for additional
information on the persons and transactions involved or other elements
involved in a particular case to provide the basis for further analysis.70 A
key element of such tactical analysis is link analysis, which has been
discussed at length above in the context of transaction monitoring and
suspicious transaction reporting. Financial intelligence units typically have
available various types of data, including those publicly available databases
to which the private sector has access. An FIU can also have access to
nonpublic databases such as tax records, police records, immigration and
customs records, vehicle registries, and supervisory findings, as well as
investigation reports for ongoing investigations, criminal records (which are
nonpublic in many countries), currency transaction reports, currency and
monetary instrument reports, and related-party data (same address or
telephone number, known associates, etc.).71
Following tactical link analysis, the FIU typically undertakes
operational analysis. Operational analysis uses tactical information to
formulate different hypotheses on the possible activities of the suspect to
produce operational intelligence for use by investigators. It uses:
[A]ll sources of information available to the FIU to produce activity
patterns, new targets, relationships among the subject and his or her
accomplices, investigative leads, criminal profiles, and—where possible—
indications of possible future behavior. One of the techniques of
operational analysis used in some FIUs is financial profiling.72

Based on such analysis, the FIU may or may not disseminate a report for
further investigation.73 In recommending an SAR for further investigation,
FIUs may include a description of what they had learned from these
different types of analysis. This is often called “actionable intelligence” that
can assist law enforcement in conducting a further investigation.
Another important function of the FIU is strategic analysis, or the
development of relevant knowledge on laundering or terrorism-financing
techniques. Examples include the identification of evolving criminal
patterns in a particular group or the provision of broad insights into
quirements. See U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 22, at 226-40 (describing the
U.S. laws that fulfill FIU obligations).
70
See SCHOTT, supra note 3, at VII-5–6 (describing the analytical role of FIUs); see also
IMF, FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS: AN OVERVIEW 57–58 (2004) [hereinafter IMF, FIUS].
71
Verhelst e-mail, supra note 13.
72
IMF, FIUS, supra note 70, at 60.
73
Id. at 61.
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emerging patterns of criminality, including transactions particular to a given
group, ideology or geographic location.74 The FIU can then use these for its
own operational analysis of STRs through linking as well as to develop
guidelines, typologies etc. for use by financial institutions.75 This generally
follows the system used by FinCEN in the U.S.76
II. DETECTION OF TERRORISM FINANCING
A.

Overview

As discussed above, the FATF adopted the Special
Recommendations in November, 2001, after the previous month’s terrorist
attacks against the U.S. However, that the financing of terrorism should be
so closely tied to anti-money laundering was by no means completely
obvious. While terrorism had existed before 9/11, the original FATF 40
made no reference to it. Anti-money laundering laws were designed to stop
criminals from taking criminal proceeds and running them through the
financial system in a series of transactions to hide their criminal origins
and/or actual ownership. On the other hand, terrorism financing need not
involve criminal origins but only a particular type of criminal destination:
terrorism.
Of course, there were some obvious connections. As discussed
above, identifying the financial institution’s clients was a key aspect of antimoney laundering preventive measures. These measures could also be used
to identify whether the client was a terrorist, provided of course that the
financial institution or the authorities knew who the terrorists were. This
proved to be a valuable avenue for combating terrorism-financing measures.
Before the 9/11 attacks, the U.N. Security Council had passed resolutions
requiring all states to freeze accounts held by members of al-Qaeda and the
Taliban and had set up the al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee.77
The Committee created a consolidated list of entities and officials
associated with these organizations, as submitted by members. Subsequent

74
See SCHOTT, supra note 3, at VII-3 (discussing definitions of FIUs that emphasis specificity to each nation’s needs and characteristics); see also IMF, FIUS, supra note 70, at 59–60
(noting that unusual transactions develop the basis for further investigation by the financial
intelligence units).
75
IMF, FIUS, supra note 70, at 60.
76
See generally U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 22, at 126–36 (discussing
record keeping rules for the banking, securities, insurance, and money services business
sectors to combat money laundering and requirements to report unusual, suspicious transactions).
77
S.C. Res. 1267, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999).
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resolutions strengthened this original commitment.78 Resolution 1373—
passed as a result of the 9/11 attacks—extended the requirement of states to
freeze accounts to terrorists other than al-Qaeda and the Taliban.79 The
General Assembly had also adopted a Convention on Suppression of
Terrorism Financing, although it did not go into force until April, 2002.80
The convention requires contracting states to take appropriate measures “for
the identification, detection and freezing or seizure of any funds used or
allocated for the purpose of committing [terrorist offenses as defined in the
convention] as well as the proceeds derived from such offences, for
purposes of possible forfeiture.”81
Assuming that someone could come up with a list of possible
terrorists, financial institutions could compare that list to their account
holders to see if there was a match, much as they could now do with known
criminals. However, as discussed above, the new anti-terrorism financing
regime required financial institutions to profile clients and monitor
transactions to see if they might have some involvement in the financing of
terrorism, and to report those cases as well. When the FATF first published
its 40 Recommendations, financial institutions in most FATF member
countries were in the process of implementing a client identification-,
78

Id. ¶ 6; see also Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and
1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, U.N. SECURITY
COUNCIL, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/ (last visited May 22, 2012) (explaining
subsequent resolutions modified and strengthened policies by designating sanction measures
to specific individuals and entities associated with Al-Qaeda).
79
S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
80
See generally International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197 [hereinafter Suppression of Financing Convention]
(prohibiting the financing of terrorism).
81
Id. art 8. The Treaty defined terrorism as acts described in any treaty in the Annex, and:
Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to
any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed
conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a
population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to
abstain from doing any act.
Id. art. 2(1)(b). The treaties listed in the Annex include unlawful seizure of aircraft, unlawful
acts against the safety of civil aviation, crimes against internationally protected persons (including diplomatic agents), the taking of hostages, the unlawful acquisition or threat to nuclear material, unlawful acts of violence at airports serving international civil aviation and
against the safety of civil aviation, unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation,
unlawful acts against the safety of fixed platforms located on the continental shelf, and terrorist bombings. Id. Annex; see also G.A. Res. 164, Annex, U.N. Doc A/52/164 (Jan. 9,
1998) (attaching the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings for
adoption by the General Assembly). With certain limited exceptions in each convention, the
terrorists must be nationals of a different state than the state in which the terrorist act took
place. See Suppression of Financing Convention, supra note 80, art. 3; see also G.A. Res.
164, supra note 81, annex, art. 2.
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profiling-, monitoring-, and STR-reporting system for criminal proceeds
reflecting the system required by the FATF 40. But when the system was
extended to terrorism financing, neither financial institutions nor their
supervisors had much, if any, relevant experience. While they had not
originally been in the business of finding criminal proceeds, at least
financial institutions had years of learning how to do so, as well as
considerable typology guidance from competent authorities, the FATF, and
FSRBs.
B.

Terrorism Typologies/Indicators/Red Flags

As discussed above, financial institutions implement their STRreporting requirements by, among other things, identifying clients
(including determining exactly who they really are), creating client profiles,
monitoring client transactions with respect to those profiles to identify large
or unusual transactions, performing link analysis, and comparing
transactions to known typologies of money laundering and terrorism to see
if any red flags are raised.
Such typologies are provided by domestic competent authorities, as
well as by the FATF or FSRBs. But what are those terrorism typologies,
indicators and red flags?
Soon after the FATF adopted the Special Recommendations, the
FATF Secretariat published Guidance for Financial Institutions in
Detecting Terrorist Financing, stating that that “[i]t should be
acknowledged…that financial institutions will probably be unable to detect
terrorist financing as such.”82 While there was mention of charities as being
of special concern, there was no attempt to tie these to any special type of
charity, or to charities sending payments to locations known to have
terrorism concerns. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the
U.S.’s Staff Report on Terrorist Financing, published two years after the
adoption of the Special IV, concluded that:
[Financial institutions] can be most useful in the fight against terrorist
financing by collecting accurate information about their customers and
providing this information . . . to aid in terrorism investigations. . . .
However, the requirement that financial institutions file SARs does not
work very well to detect or prevent terrorist financing, for there is a
fundamental distinction between money laundering and terrorist financing.

82

FATF, GUIDANCE
(2002).

FOR

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN DETECTING TERRORIST FINANCING 3
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Financial institutions have the information and expertise to detect the one
but not the other.83

In its sixth report, the U.N. Security Council’s Monitoring Team
was not enthusiastic about the effectiveness of preventive measures in
deterring terrorism financing, in part because of lack of guidance. “The
volume of suspicious transaction reports has increased tremendously,
though the procedure suffers from a lack of guidance as to what to look for.
. . . Only a small proportion of the reports are related to terrorist financing
and hardly any have been associated with Al-Qaida.”84
Early in 2008, the FATF released its most comprehensive report to
date on terrorist financing.85 The Report stated that “[d]espite the challenge
in developing generic indicators of terrorist financing activity financial
institutions may nevertheless identify unusual characteristics about a
transaction that should prompt the filing of a suspicious transaction
report.”86 However, the cases and examples dealt almost entirely with
individuals or organizations identified as having terrorism connections
rather than through terrorism financing indicators (including “media
coverage of account holder’s activities,”87 presumably when the media
reveals that someone may be connected to terrorism in some way). The only
uniquely terrorism financing indicators noted in the Report were charity and
relief organizations sending to or receiving funds from “locations of specific
concern.”
While there has so far been relatively little guidance to financial
institutions as to indicators or typologies of greater risk of terrorism
financing, they are still required to implement Special IV, VI, and VII.
Anecdotal evidence gathered largely from informal interviews with
compliance officers at financial institutions in the U.S. has indicated that at
least some financial institutions have implemented “defensive” systems
based largely on whether a client or potential client is a charity that makes
payments to charities based in terrorism “hot spots;” this includes not
accepting the charity as a client or filing STRs after a charity makes any
83

JOHN ROTH, DOUGLAS GREENBURG, & SERENA WILLE, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING,
STAFF REPORT TO THE COMMISSION 52–54 (2004).
84
Sixth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanction Monitoring Team, transmitted by
letter dated Mar. 8, 2007 from the Chairman of the Security Council Comm. established
pursuant to resolutions 1526 (2004) and 1617 (2005) concerning Al-Qaeda and the Taliban
and associated individuals and entities, at 24, U.N. Doc. S/2007/132 (Mar. 8, 2007).
85
See generally FATF, TERRORIST FINANCING (2008) (exploring issues of terrorist requirements for fund, how terrorists raise and move fund, and the international response to
terrorist financing).
86
Id. at 29.
87
Id. at 31.
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large transaction. If true, this would not only raise costs to financial
institutions, but would also reduce financial services to needy clients. It
would also suggest that financial institutions’ STRs included at least a high
number of false positives (and perhaps a high number of false negatives),
which would raise costs to FIUs and law enforcement without improving
capacity to deter or prevent terrorism financing.
III. STUDY TO IDENTIFY TERRORISM FINANCING INDICATORS
A.

Overview

This preliminary study on terrorism-related prosecutions in the U.S.
was completed by Professor Richard Gordon of the Case Western Reserve
University, with assistance from students at Case Western. It is to be used in
the completion of a final report by Professor Nikos Passas of Northeastern
University and the Honorable Susan Eckert of Brown University, which will
include cases from other jurisdictions, additional analytical discussion, and
bibliographical material.
The objective of the U.S. study is to identify red flags or indicators
of terrorism that financial institutions can use in implementing their duties
to monitor client transactions and report those that raise a suspicion of
terrorism financing. The study research methodology included five steps:
(1) We selected terrorism cases that were successfully prosecuted.
(2) We examined those cases to determine which involved a
transaction though a regulated financial institution, and we
collected the relevant client identification, profiling, and
transaction data.
(3) We examined the data to identify any possible indicators of
terrorism financing.
(4) We determined if any SARs were filed by financial institutions
with respect to those transactions. We reviewed the SARs to see
why they were filed, including by examining the SAR narrative
to determine what, if any, additional information the reporting
institution had uncovered.
(5) Finally, we determined if FinCEN had referred the SAR for
further investigation.
While it was relatively easy to complete steps 1 and 2, difficulties
arose with completing the other steps. In particular, with respect to step 3 it
proved difficult to acquire actual records of most of the identified
transactions and impossible to acquire client identifying and profiling
information, although in a number of cases it proved possible to acquire
sufficient descriptive information to make some tentative conclusions about
possible indicators. With respect to step 4, while research was continuing,
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FinCEN proposed a new regulation (which became final in December 2010)
that changed previous law, which had permitted a financial institution to
release an SAR, provided that it did not “tip off” persons involved in the
suspicious transaction. (This would have been an impossibility in the cases
we were reviewing because all the persons had already been prosecuted.)
The new regulation made step 5 in our methodology impossible to
implement.
As a result, the findings of this study are more tentative than was
expected at the outset. However, the study suggests some alternatives that
might be pursued that could help rectify the deficiencies in the current study
that arose due to the inability to implement steps 4 and 5.
B.

Steps 1 & 2: Terrorism Case Selection, Identification of those
Involving Financial Transactions and Collection of Transaction
Records

In December, 2008, Jeffrey Breinholt88 of the U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ) provided the project with a list of 230 U.S. cases that he, in
consultation with and other DOJ officials had identified as involving a
prosecution in which the U.S. alleged that the defendants(s) may have been
involved in supporting terrorism or some form of terrorist activity. 89 This
list did not include the 9/11 case, which had been reviewed extensively by
the U.S. 9/11 Commission and which did not turn up any apparent
terrorism-financing indicators. This list was supplemented in October, 2010
with an additional thirty-three cases to bring the list up-to-date.
By reviewing DOJ press releases, news stories, and published court
opinions, researchers identified forty-seven cases as possibly involving
terrorism financing. Each involved either deposit-taking institutions or
money-transfer agents. Researchers then collected and reviewed relevant
court documents that were either published or made available free of charge
through the Internet. These often included pleadings and motions, including
bills of indictment and requests for warrants, freezing orders, material
witness orders, and supporting affidavits. On rare occasions, some evidence
submitted during the trial was also located and reviewed. Of considerable
help to locating such materials is The Nine Eleven Finding Answers
Foundation (NEFA), which maintains a website that includes many
publically available documents on terrorism-related criminal and civil
88
Mr. Breinholt has been Deputy Chief, Counterterrorism Section and Coordinator, Terrorist Financing Task Force of the U.S. Department of Justice.
89
In many of the prosecutions, charges were not brought for either terrorism or material
support, but in all instances charges were brought for some other offence, including: making
false statements; immigration fraud; money laundering (including structuring or operation or
use of unlicensed MSBs); threats other than terrorist threats; hoaxes; and air violence. Material witness orders that involved no criminal charge were also included.
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cases.90 From the group of forty-seven, researchers identified thirty that
might involve both terrorism financing and a regulated financial institution.
For these cases, researchers attempted to collect and examine documents
and evidence not published or available for free on the internet.
Researchers first attempted to obtain copies of client identification,
profiling information, and transaction records from the banks and transfer
agents in question. However, these reporting persons refused to share such
records, citing the expense involved in collecting and providing us with
such information and the concern that doing so might breach FinCEN’s
SAR confidentiality rules.91 They made this later point even though we did
not mention SARs themselves and even though no law or regulation made
reference to the confidentiality of information that may have given rise to
the filing of an SAR.
Failing in this attempt, researchers then turned to records made
available as evidence in prosecution of the terrorism cases. In theory, all
publicly available case documents, including all evidence submitted for
trial, can be obtained in two ways: (1) in hard copy from the relevant court
(mostly for cases that are older than ten years); or (2) through the online
federal court filing and retrieval system known as PACER. However, in
many cases the number of pages of documents filed from beginning to end
run to the tens of thousands. The court keeps a docket of filings for each
case, but the docket entries themselves rarely identify exactly what kind of
evidence, if any, is included in the filing. As a result, it becomes necessary
to individually examine documents to identify those that relate to financial
transactions. For documents filed with the court in hard copy, this requires
physically visiting the court, requesting documents from the court clerk, and
reviewing them on-site. For most relevant documents filed through PACER,
this requires downloading each page at a cost of $ 0.10 per page.
After attempting and failing to identify relevant documents by
reviewing court dockets filed on PACER, researchers contacted via e-mail
and telephone92 those DOJ personnel who prosecuted each case for
assistance identifying relevant documents. Follow-up e-mails and telephone
calls were made where appropriate. Prosecutors had to divert their time
from other pressing work to assist researchers with work that would not (at

90
See Featured Legal Cases, NINE ELEVEN FINDING ANSWERS [NEFA] FOUNDATION,
http://nefafoundation.org//index.cfm?pageID=29 (last visited May 22, 2012) (providing a
portal to domestic criminal and civil and international cases on terrorism).
91
Given the nature of the refusals given by the first few approached, researchers gave up
without pursuing the rest, deeming any additional efforts to be pointless.
92
Each e-mail described the nature and purpose of the project, summarized the available
details of the case, and requested any information regarding financial transactions, especially
PACER document numbers.
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least directly) assist in the prosecution of cases, current or future.93 Not
surprisingly, in many instances prosecutors were not able to respond to
requests for assistance.94 In many instances, prosecutors informed us that for
various reasons (including decisions not to charge defendants with crimes
requiring financial transaction evidence or the entrance of guilty pleas to
such crimes prior to the introduction of evidence) no relevant documents
were admitted into evidence, and therefore they could not be shared with
researchers. As a result, only in a few cases have prosecutors been able to
share with researchers actual documentary evidence of financial
transactions. In those instances, however, thousands of pages representing
tens of thousands of transactions have been provided.
Of those thirty cases, researchers found sufficient financial
information to draw conclusions in twenty-four. A description of these
cases, and of the relevant information obtained with respect to financial
transactions are included in the Annex.
C.

Step 3: Analysis of Transactions for Indicators

As discussed above, in order to determine if a transaction is
suspicious it is necessary for the financial institution to identify and profile
the client, to monitor the client’s transactions, and to examine transactions.
However, in the initial review of the thirty cases for evidence of suspicious
transactions, it was not possible to consult client identification and profiling
information. Nevertheless, in the vast majority of instances it was possible
to take educated guesses, based on publicly available information
concerning the client in question, to determine if payments would fit an
assumed client profile as being legitimate. This is because most transactions
fall into three types: (1) those that are too small to be consequential; (2)
those that are consequential but that appear to be between individuals or
entities with no obvious legitimate connection that would render the
transaction suspicious; and (3) those that appear to be between individuals
or entities with a legitimate reason to make the transaction.

93

Case Western Reserve University researchers discussed this matter with a number of
prosecutors. Some noted that while the results of our research project might help future financial institution compliance officers and/or investigators in identifying terrorism financing
suspects, the results would be unlikely to help those who ultimately prosecuted those cases.
Some also suggested that they believed that, from their experience, there were no “terrorism
indicators,” and that the project was unlikely to be of any assistance to law enforcement.
94
In a few instances prosecutors had left the DOJ for private practice. In these cases they
did respond to e-mail inquiries but were unable to assist in finding relevant documents.
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Step 4: Review any SARs Filed

As discussed above, part of a reporting institution’s preventive
measures obligation is to examine any unusual transaction to determine if
there is an actual suspicion that it concerns terrorism financing. Because the
methods by which reporting persons implement these requirements are
expensive and proprietary, they are understandably reticent to share any
details. We sought instead to obtain copies of any SARs filed so that we
could examine the narratives and determine if link analysis, reference to any
publically available information on the clients, or typologies might have
played a role in uncovering relevant indicator information. We were not
successful.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
states that “[t]he global war on terrorism and cutting off terrorist financing
is a policy priority for the U.S. and its partners, working bilaterally and
multilaterally through the U.N., the U.N. Security Council and its
committees…and other multilateral fora.”95 Under § 5318(g) of the USA
Patriot Act,96 a financial institution and its agents are prohibited from
notifying any person who is the subject of an SAR either that an SAR was
filed or of the circumstances surrounding the filing. Congress apparently
included this provision in order to prevent the tipping off of launderers and
terrorists, which could spoil any current or future investigation. There was,
however, no prohibition on release of information that an SAR had been
filed or of the SAR itself that applied to government authorities. The
implementing regulations essentially restated the statutory language.97 Also,
courts had held that SARs were not strictly confidential and that disclosure
of an SAR in a case where the subject of the report has already been
convicted will not compromise an ongoing law enforcement investigation,
or provide information to a criminal wishing to evade detection.98 This was
clearly the situation with respect to the cases we were investigating.
Based on such policy, law, and precedent, researchers requested
copies from the DOJ of any SARs filed with respect to the thirty cases that
we had identified, but with any information concerning innocent persons
redacted. Officials at the DOJ were sympathetic and prepared to release
95
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, §
7701, 118 Stat. 3638, 3858 (2004).
96
31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(2)(A) (2006).
97
See 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(k) (2011) (providing similar guidance in the administrative regulation as in the enacting legislation).
98
See Whitney Nat’l Bank v. Karam, 306 F. Supp. 2d 678, 680 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (noting
that SAR disclosure poses a threat when a suspect is still at large); see also BizCapital &
Indus. Corp. v. Comptroller of Currency, 467 F.3d 871, 873 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting that
SARs are not categorically privileged under certain circumstances).
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redacted SARs to researchers, but then FinCEN issued a new regulation that
prohibits private or public sector persons from revealing if an SAR was
filed, or any contents of that SAR, to anyone in any circumstances.99 While
there appears to be no statutory authority for such a regulation (and
therefore that it may be ultra vires, the statute may therefore be invalid), its
issuance prevented DOJ from releasing any redacted SARs to researchers.
Because we were unable to review the SARs, it was impossible for
researchers to obtain the information necessary to determine if financial
institutions had in fact used their knowledge of customer information,
customer transactions, and link analysis, typologies, etc. to conclude that a
transaction was suspicious. It also made it impossible for researchers to
determine if FinCEN had referred such SARs to law enforcement for further
investigation, or if they had added actionable intelligence to the SARs that
would suggest either money laundering or terrorism financing.
E.

Response to New Regulation Preventing Implementation of Step 4

While the new Regulation prevents both public and private sectors
from revealing if SARs have been filed or the contents of those SARs, it
also made clear that “[w]ith respect to the SAR confidentiality provisions
only, institutions may disclose underlying facts, transactions, and
documents for any purpose, provided that no person involved in the
transaction is notified and none of the underlying information reveals the
existence of an SAR.”100 For this reason, financial institutions should no
longer be concerned with SAR confidentiality issues, and they should only
be concerned about the costs of releasing identification, profiling, and
transaction documents. Financial institutions may, however, continue to be
reticent about releasing any link analysis that might lead a reviewer to
believe that an SAR had, in fact, been filed.
In order to encourage reporting persons to release identification,
profiling and transaction data with respect to the identified cases,
researchers have approached a number of financial institutions and
requested that they create a committee to assist the Counterterrorism Task
Force in identifying terrorism financing methodologies (CACTF). The
Committee would encourage reporting persons in question to release the
relevant documents, and it would provide technical assistance where
needed. We expect CACTF to be up and running by End May, 2011.

99

See FinCEN; Confidentiality of Suspicious Activity Reports, 75 Fed. Reg. 75593,
75598 (Dec. 3, 2010) (to be codified as 31 C.F.R. § 103) (explaining exceptions for connected parties and certain other government officials).
100
Id. (citations omitted).
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New Step 5: Review Documents released by Reporting Persons

Researchers are working with the initial members of CACTF to
plan a workshop sometime in the fall of 2011 to review any released
documents. The workshop will include AML/CFT compliance officers from
member banks. It is hoped that this conference will help deepen our
understanding of the nature of the cases identified in this Report.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Based on assumptions concerning client identification and profiles,
researchers examined transactions to determine if there was anything
unusual in those transactions that would raise a suspicion of terrorism
financing. In doing so, we did not indicate instances where a person was
identifiable as a terrorist or terrorist organization, in that this was not an
“indicator” but a fact.
In the twenty-four cases where sufficient financial information was
available to draw a conclusion, fourteen indicated instances of classic
money laundering typologies, including placement, layering, integration, or
an unlicensed money service business. Only three of these cases involved
criminal proceeds, although an additional three appear to involve diversion
of charitable donations to terrorists which could have, in effect, constituted
theft of legitimate donations. In eight cases there was no suspicious
transaction of any kind (other than a party to a transaction was a known
terrorist), although in two of these, criminal proceeds were involved. Only
one indicated a possible set of transactions that might be a unique indicator
for terrorism financing.
Terrorist financers appear to be using classic money laundering
typologies regardless of whether they are trying to launder the proceeds of
crime. It appears that they do so either to hide the origins of the funds or the
recipient of the funds without leaving a directly traceable transaction
between origin and recipient. In other words, they are acting in a fashion
similar to that of former New York Governor Eliot Spitzer, who used classic
structuring transactions to hide that he was making payments to
prostitutes.101
Therefore, simply by using standard anti-money laundering
typologies financial institutions should have been able to identify fourteen
of the twenty-four instances of terrorism financing as being suspicious,
though not on their face to raise suspicion of terrorism financing. What we
can tell from examining the cases is that it might have been possible for the
101

See generally Gordon, Trysts or Terrorists?, supra note 1 (explaining how SARs exposed governor Eliot Spitzer’s political scandal involving money laundering and prostitution).
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reporting institution to have discovered terrorism connections during the
examination process, or for FinCEN to have done so when receiving the
SAR. However, because researchers did not have access to this information
it is impossible to determine at this time.
The one case indicating a possible set of transactions that might be
a unique indicator for terrorism financing involved repeat purchases from a
military equipment store. To determine if this should raise a suspicion of
terrorism finance, it would be necessary to see if such purchases are, in fact,
sufficiently unusual to distinguish them in a meaningful way from nonterrorism related purchases. This could perhaps be done by comparing them
with other purchases from similar stores. Researchers will attempt to locate
such information for the final Report.
SUMMARY TABLE
DATA, TYPE OF TRANSACTION(S), SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION
Case
#

Data Available

Type of Transaction(s)

1

Detailed information
on wire and check
transactions.

2

General description
only.

3
4

No description.
General description
only.

Multiple significant wire
transfers among charities
with bank accounts in
various jurisdictions; final
withdrawal of cash transferred to terrorist organization. No obvious legitimate connection.
Single significant wire
transfer from a personal
bank account in the US to
a personal bank account
in Canada. No obvious
legitimate connection.
Unknown.
Cash deposits to personal
bank account followed by
a series of small denominated checks paid to a
business unrelated to the
payor. No obvious legitimate connection.

Suspicious Transaction(s) [ST]?
If yes, type
Proceeds of crime
[PC]?
ST: Yes.
ML: Layering, integration.
PC: No.

ST: Yes.
ML: Placement, layering.
PC: Yes.

Unknown.
Yes.
ML: Placement, layering, possible integration.
PC: No.
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Case
#

Data Available

Type of Transaction(s)

5

General description
only.

6

Detailed information
on wire and check
transactions.

7

General description
only.

8

General description
only.

9

General description
only.

Large wire transfers from
personal accounts in one
jurisdiction to multiple
accounts in another. No
obvious legitimate connection.
Wire and check transfers
from company account
controlled by one person
in one jurisdiction to a
personal account controlled by the same person
in another jurisdiction.
Significant cash deposits
and wire transfers from
various personal accounts
to a single person’s account, followed by transfers to a charity in another
jurisdiction, followed by
further transfers to multiple accounts in other jurisdictions. No obvious
legitimate connection.
Wire or check transactions from one charity to
numerous accounts of
unknown control, receipt
of a very large amount
from a foreign account of
unknown control to a
charity. No obvious legitimate connection.
Significant cross border
wire transaction from
company in one jurisdiction with possible ownership/control held by possible terrorists to numerous accounts in other
jurisdictions of unknown
control. No obvious legitimate connection.

797

Suspicious Transaction(s) [ST]?
If yes, type
Proceeds of crime
[PC]?
Yes.
ML: Placement, layering and/or unlicensed MSB.
PC: No.
ST: No.
PC No.

ST: Yes.
ML: Placement, layering, possible integration, and/or unlicensed MSB.
PC: No.

ST: Yes.
ML: Possible placement (depending on
nature of deposits),
layering.
PC: Diversion of
charitable donations.

ST: Yes.
ML: Possible placement (depending on
nature of deposits),
layering.
PC: No.

File: Gordon 2

Created on: 6/16/2012 12:46:00 PM

Last Printed: 9/21/2012 8:41:00 PM

798

CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 44:765
Suspicious Transaction(s) [ST]?
If yes, type
Proceeds of crime
[PC]?
ST: Unknown.
PC: Yes.
ST: Yes.
ML: Placement, layering, and/or unlicensed MSB.
PC: Yes.

Case
#

Data Available

Type of Transaction(s)

10

Sale of stolen telephone cards.
General description
only.

Unknown.

11

12

General description
only.

13

General description
only.

14

Detailed information.

Cash deposits, large international wire transfers
from personal bank accounts under false name
to money transfer companies with unknown account names/owner or
controller. No obvious
legitimate connection.
Large number of cash
deposits under different
business names at various
banks to a single account
at one business with no
obvious business connection, large wire transfers
from that business to different bank accounts in
other jurisdictions. No
obvious legitimate connection.
Numerous deposits made
to various individual accounts, then transferred to
single accounts in different jurisdiction, then
checks paid to individuals
in a third jurisdiction. No
obvious legitimate connection.
Small amounts sent via
wire transfers from a bank
account in one jurisdiction
to various individual bank
accounts in another jurisdiction. No obvious legitimate connection.

ST: Yes.
ML: Placement, layering, and/or unlicensed MSB.
PC: No.

ST: Yes.
ML: Placement, layering, possible integration.
PC: Diversion of
charitable donations.

ST: No.
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Case
#

Data Available

Type of Transaction(s)

15

Some detailed information on wire and
check transactions,
some actual transaction records.

16

General description
only.

17

General description
only.

18

General description
only.

19

Detailed information.

Large international wire
transfers from various
charitable and personal
accounts in one jurisdiction to personal accounts
in another jurisdiction
(some in the name of the
same individual) in another jurisdiction. No obvious legitimate connection
in all cases.
Small MSB wire transfers
by a person in one jurisdiction to a person in
another jurisdiction.
Large bank transfers from
accounts in one jurisdiction to multiple accounts
held by one person at
multiple banks in another
jurisdiction. Large numbers of transfers from one
personal bank account in
that jurisdiction to many
different recipient accounts in the same jurisdiction. No obvious legitimate connection.
Direct bank transfers from
a charity in one jurisdiction to two charities in
another jurisdiction.
Large transfers from a
number of individual bank
accounts in one country to
a number of individual
bank accounts in other
countries. No obvious
legitimate connection.

799

Suspicious Transaction(s) [ST]?
If yes, type
Proceeds of crime
[PC]?
ST: Yes.
ML: Layering, possible integration.
PC: Diversion of
charitable donations.

ST: No.
PC: No.

ST: Yes.
ML: Layering, possible integration.
PC: Unclear.

ST: No.
PC: Diversion of
charitable donations.
ST: Yes.
ML: Placement, layering.
PC: Yes.
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Suspicious Transaction(s) [ST]?
If yes, type
Proceeds of crime
[PC]?
ST: Possible.
ML: Large transfers
to unrelated person
may not fit client
profile raising suspicion of layering.
PC: No.

Case
#

Data Available

Type of Transaction(s)

20

General description
only.

21

No description.

Wire transfers from personal accounts in one
jurisdiction to the personal accounts of the same
individual in other jurisdictions. Large wire transfers from one personal
account in the US to the
personal account of an
unconnected individual in
another jurisdiction. No
obvious legitimate connection?
Unknown.

22

Some detailed information.

23

General description
only.
Court documents
provide detailed information on wire and
check transactions
including payment
records.

24

25

General description
only.

Large wire transfers from
company account in one
jurisdiction to account in
another. Because a sting
operation, unknown if
recipient account was
profiled by bank.
Size and origin of MSB
wire transfers unknown.
Small deposits to charity
bank account in one jurisdiction, wire transfers to
large number of unrelated
individual bank accounts
in another jurisdiction,
then wire transfers to
large number of unrelated
individual bank accounts
in various additional jurisdictions, then cash
withdrawn. No obvious
legitimate connection.
Deposits.

ST: Unknown.
No.
ST: Unknown.
PC: Presumed no.

ST: Unknown.
PC: Yes.
ST: Yes.
ML: Layering, integration.
PC: No.

ST: No.
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Case
#

Data Available

Type of Transaction(s)

26

General description
only.

27

General description
only.

28

General description
only.

29

General description
only.

Cross border payments of
unknown type, single
small cross border wire
transfer.
Small number of small
MSB wire transfers from
one jurisdiction to several
individuals in multiple
jurisdictions.
Fraudulent credit card
application, credit card
payments.
Debit card payments to a
designated terrorist organization and to high-tech
military equipment companies; medium sized
cross-border wire transfer
to an unknown person.

30

General description
only.

Medium-sized cross border wire transfer.

801

Suspicious Transaction(s) [ST]?
If yes, type
Proceeds of crime
[PC]?
ST: Unknown.

ST: No.
ST: No.

ST: No.
PC: Yes.
ST: Possible.
TF: Repeat purchases
from military equipment store?
PC: No.

ST: No.
PC: No.

